1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN		
2	SOUTHERN DIVISION		
3	IN THE MATTER OF, Case No. 13-53846 Detroit, Michigan		
4	CITY OF DETROIT, MI September 10, 2013 / 10:01 a.m.		
5			
6	IN RE: NOTICE OF PROPOSED FEE REVIEW ORDER. CREDITOR MICHAEL BEYDOUN'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY.		
7	RESPONSE OF INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW TO AUGUST 26, 2013 ORDER REGARDING ELIGIBILITY OBJECTIONS.		
8	THE MICHIGAN COUNCIL 25 OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO AND SUB-CHAPTER 98, CITY		
9	OF DETROIT RETIREES' (I) OBJECTIONS AND COMMENTS TO THE COURT'S AUGUST 26, 2013 ORDER REGARDING ELIGIBILITY		
10	OBJECTIONS, NOTICES OF HEARING AND CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) & (b) and (II) EXPEDITED MOTION TO COMPEL		
11	DEPOSITIONS OF CITY WITNESSES.		
12	CONSOLIDATED COMMENT OF RETIREE ASSOCIATION PARTIES TO ORDER REGARDING ELIGIBILITY OBJECTIONS.		
13	OBJECTIONS/COMMENTS OF ROBBIE FLOWERS, MICHAEL WELLS, JANET WHITSON, MARY WASHINGTON, AND BRUCE GOLDMAN TO ORDER OF 26 AUGUST 2013.		
14			
15	NOTICES OF HEARING AND CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 243(a) and (b).		
16	COMMENTS OF THE DETROIT RETIREMENT SYSTEMS TO THE ORDER		
17	REGARDING ELIGIBILITY OBJECTIONS NOTICES OF HEARINGS AND CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) and (b).		
18	MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER FILED BY THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.		
19	BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEVEN W. RHODES TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: ROBIN WYSOCKI		
20	APPEARANCES:		
21	For the City of Detroit, MI: JEFFREY B. ELLMAN, ESQ.		
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25 13	-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 1 of 91		

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25 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 2 of 91				

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25 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 3 of 91					

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        (Court in Session)
              THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please
 2
   be seated. Case number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan.
 3
 4
              THE COURT: Good morning everybody.
 5
             THE ATTORNEYS: Good morning.
              THE COURT: We have an application for admission to
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 7
   the Bar of the Court. Ms. Fenning, would you step forward,
 8
   please?
 9
             MS. FENNING: Good morning, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Good morning. One second. Are you
10
   prepared to take the oath of admission to the Bar of the
12
   Court?
13
             MS. FENNING: Yes, sir.
              THE COURT: Please raise your right hand.
14
        Do you affirm that you will conduct yourself as an
15
16
   attorney and counselor of this Court with integrity and
17
   respect for the law, that you have read and -- and will abide
18
   by the civility principles approved by the Court, and that you
   will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the
19
20
   United States?
21
             MS. FENNING: I do.
22
             THE COURT: Welcome.
23
             MS. FENNING: Thank you.
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             THE COURT: We'll take care of your paperwork for
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Okay. We have several things on our docket today. I'd like to take them -- one second -- in the following order. First, the fee examiner order. Second, the motion for relief from stay. Third, the comments regarding the eligibility order. And fourth, the motion to quash. Is that okay with everybody?

THE ATTORNEYS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's start with the fee examiner order. Mr. Fishman is here.

MR. FISHMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Robert Fishman. I am the appointed fee examiner in this case. I would like to briefly explain to you how the piece of paper that you have came to be.

As Your Honor will recall, you entered an order on August 19th appointing me as the fee examiner. As directed, I met with counsel for the city on August 20th. We had a conceptual discussion about many issues and after that meeting, I created the first draft of a proposed order. That order went back and forth between me and counsel for the city many times with lots of discussions about various points in it.

We finally arrived at an order that was acceptable to us and I filed on August $30^{\rm th}$, I believe, the proposed order that the Court has. And that was an order that the city was prepared to consent to.

Subsequently, or at -- I think more like simultaneously, 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 6 of 91

the retirees' committee was being appointed and it eventually retained counsel. And that counsel reached out to me, I think, on the very day the order -- the proposed order was filed.

I had a number of conversations with them. They raised some issues, some of which I thought were entirely appropriate. I know that there had been a number of conversations that have taken place between counsel for the committee and the city that I was not a party to.

And what I have to hand up, Your Honor, is a clean and red line version of the order that has now currently been agreed to with two open points that I will discuss after I hand the order up to you.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FISHMAN: All right. The two open points, Your Honor, are both in Paragraph 24. I don't know which -- whether you're looking at the clean or the red line version.

THE COURT: I have the -- the clean one open here.

MR. FISHMAN: Okay. The clean one, the two issues are highlighted in bold text. And they are as follows, Your Honor.

The city wishes to have the right to seek a judicial determination of the reasonableness of the fees of the committee professionals to the extent they disagree with

whatever conclusion that I might reach. And apparently the 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 7 of 91 $\,$

committee is not in favor of that provision.

I'm actually quite neutral on this point. Whether they have access to the Court, or -- or don't, doesn't really affect what I'll do or how I'll do it. And therefore I identified the issue, but I really don't have a position on it.

The second open question, Your Honor, is later on in Paragraph 24 on the next page. And that involves what I'll call a reciprocal right.

In the order that I negotiated with the city, it was agreed that since the city was paying the bill, it ought to have the right to look at the invoices and it ought to have the right to express an opinion which I could then either agree with, disagree with, modify, ignore, accept, whatever I wanted to do and we built into the process an opportunity for the city to send me whatever comments it wanted to and then I would do with them as I saw fit.

The committee has asked for the same right to comment on the invoices of the -- excuse me, the committee has asked for the same right to comment on the invoices of the city's professionals. The city is unwilling to agree to that. I'm a little less neutral on this one, only -- only to this extent.

I -- I gave the -- I conceded to the city the right to comment on the invoices because I perceived it to be their

²⁵ money and they needed some opportunity to determine if they 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 8 of 91

had an issue with the way the city's money was being spent.

That seemed appropriate and while I'm not looking for their

help in evaluating reasonableness, I'm not unwilling to

receive their views if they want to take the time to send

them.

I don't so much see the committee as having the same role with respect to the city's professionals. I don't want to say that I am opposed to it, that would be an overstatement. But I -- I think it less necessary than the converse which the order does provide and those are the two open issues. And at this point, Your Honor, I think it's a discussion between the city and the committee and I would yield the floor to them to say whatever they want to say about this.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. WILKINS: Good morning, Judge Rhodes. Matthew Wilkins. We are co-counsel for the Official Committee of Retirees. With me is Mr. Claude Montgomery who's lead counsel from the Dentons firm.

Your Honor, we do support the fee examiner process and also commend Your Honor's choice of Mr. Fishman. It was an excellent choice.

Mr. Fishman did correctly lay out the -- the chain of events. We did have some very productive discussions with him. We had some very productive discussions with the city counsel. Those took place in a fairly compressed time frame 53846-tit Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 9 of 91

and he did characterize the two open issues and the committee's view in short is this.

The committee would be fine with leaving all the determinations to the fee examiner of -- of the fees of all professionals. Conversely, in the committee's view if the city is going to have a chance to determine or make comments on the reasonableness of our professional fees, we would like that same ability with respect to their fees.

And that is it -- that is it in a nutshell. So we -- we don't really care which way it goes, either all examiner or you know, both of us having comments, but that's how we think it ought to be done to -- to keep it balanced, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ELLMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Jeffrey Ellman from Jones, Day on behalf of the city. Thank you for hearing us today.

As the Court is aware and recalls, the city did consent to the fee examiner process and we do appreciate the Court's effort to create a process that has developed some accountability and transparency. And we also very much appreciate Mr. Fishman's willingness to engage us in a dialogue, although there have been a number of back and forth exchanges of drafts. I would say the process was not a difficult one. And although we didn't agree with everything that he wanted in the order, we did agree 13846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 10 of 91

He -- he accommodated us on things and we agreed to accommodate him. And as the Court I'm sure is aware, we filed a week ago our notice of our consent which I think is important because there are a number of things in the order I think the city needs to consent to to make this really work under the statute.

With respect to the committee, we made really a lot of progress in resolving the committee's issues as well as counsel said in a short time frame. We've engaged in discussions. You have the black line. Of course I'd be happy to go through anything in that black line, it's probably difficult for you to -- to read it and listen to us talking at the same time, so I know it's a challenge.

We are very close to agreement. I think the two issues have been framed. I'd like to give a little more information about those.

When the discussions started the real question was, as you might imagine, how is the committee fee process going to work because there wasn't -- there wasn't a lot of stuff in the order about that of course. And the city have committed to pay the reasonable fees.

And the starting point of the discussion was the city would like to review the bills. And -- and just the way the city reviews its own professional bills and there's an

fee examiner process.

The committee, maybe not surprisingly, said we don't really want to show you our entire bill. It has sensitive information in it. It has strategic information.

So we said okay, we will concede that the fee examiner process should determine reasonableness. We -- we should see the redacted bill. Of course it's not to be the full level of information. We'd be happy to give -- to be able to see it, to be able to get at least some thoughts to the fee examiner to consider as -- as Mr. Fishman said, for whatever the work, he could think they're worth a lot or not very much.

We have no involvement in the discussion between the fee examiner and the professional. No involvement in the preparation of the report. Whatever he says is reasonable we're going to pay. And in fact the -- the order with our agreement, which I think is important again, it very clearly puts a stake in the ground that says we will pay what is found to be reasonable.

Given that we -- we don't direct the -- the committee's professionals, we don't have a relationship with them, we don't get to see the unredacted bill, we have at least four professionals already they have retained we're paying for with public funds. We believe it is appropriate to give a summary course to Your Honor to help us look at this if we thought

25 they were -- the -- the conclusion of the fee examiner might 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 12 of 91

have something in it that we -- we didn't like.

We don't aspire to do that. We're not looking to have fee hearings all the time. We're hoping we'll never have one. But it seemed to us fair under those facts that we should have the right to do that and we proposed -- we proposed that. The committee obviously didn't agree.

On the second -- on the second point, as far as their review of our fees, our fees meaning the city's professional fees, we felt pretty strongly that's not really the role of the committee.

The only reason that the city wants to review the fees, or have any role in the committee's fees is because they have to pay for them out of -- out of the city's money. And we think we have a process that we've proposed that is fair and limited in our review. We only see the redacted bills, et cetera.

And from the committee's perspective, they don't need the bill to do their job which is to protect the retirees. The bills under this process will be filed publicly redacted versions.

Obviously it's very important for the city to protect confidentiality and privilege so that the public filing won't unredacted, it won't be the full bill necessarily, but those bills will be public. They're not going to be secret. And they're also going to be reviewed by the city and the fee 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 13 of 91

examiner. And that is his role to do this. We're paying the fee examiner to do that review.

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So in our -- in our view the -- the fee review is not the role of the committee. They don't need the bills to do their job. So we -- we felt fairly strongly that that was not something that was appropriate. It wasn't really reciprocal because the parties are in very different positions.

This Court is not approving our fees. There isn't a fee review process in that sense. It's really simply a determination of reasonableness which we -- we trust that the fee examiner will do -- will do well.

And with that, I think the last thing would be any comments or questions the Court has. Obviously you have the black line which has a number of other things in it we haven't talked about, but they have -- they have been agreed to by the parties.

THE COURT: All right. Stay where you are. And Mr. Fishman, would you approach the lectern as well?

First, I'm going to take these two issues under advisement. So I'm going to need one or the other of you to submit really both the -- the black line and the clean versions to the Court in Word format through the order processing program of the Court.

I have two issues of my own that I'd like to raise with 25 you, one of which is -- is minor, and one of which will, I 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 14 of 91

think, require your consideration. 1 2 The first is that the judiciary has this newfound preference that time periods in orders be in multiples of 3 4 seven days. So can I ask you to adjust your ten and 15 day periods and your 45 day periods accordingly. Any objection to 5 that? 6 7 MR. FISHMAN: I do not have an objection to that. 8 THE COURT: And it doesn't' matter to me whether 9 your ten goes to seven, or 14. You'll work all of that out. 10 MR. ELLMAN: And that's fine, Your Honor. THE COURT: Second, and more significantly, if 11 12 you'll turn to Page 8 of the clean version, excuse me, Paragraph 28, the last sentence. 13 MR. ELLMAN: Paragraph 28, Your Honor? 14 15 THE COURT: Paragraph 28, yes. 16 MR. ELLMAN: Yes. THE COURT: It strikes me that the -- the deadline 17 18 of the 10th calendar day is short, too short. I wonder if you would consent to 28 days in that paragraph. 19 20 MR. FISHMAN: Your Honor, I -- that is a paragraph 21 that I wrote not surprisingly. It really comes almost verbatim out of the American Airlines order. I -- I don't 22 know if they spent a lot of time coming up with ten days, but 23 I spent no time coming up with it and therefore 28 days is as

arbitrarily acceptable to me as ten days was. 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 15 of 91

1 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. I will -- I will 2 look for your Word versions of these two documents and enter 3 an order shortly. 4 MR. FISHMAN: Thank you very much. 5 MR. ELLMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you all for your work in preparing 6 7 this order. I know all the work you put into it. 8 MR. FISHMAN: Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Let's turn our attention to the 9 10 motion for relief from the stay. Anyone here on that matter? MR. ELLMAN: Your Honor, Jeffrey Ellman from Jones, 11 12 Day on behalf of the debtor. I'm -- I'm here on behalf of the 13 city. We did oppose the motion. It's obviously not our motion -- it's not our motion to present. 14 15 THE COURT: Are there -- are there attorneys or others who need to be permitted to enter the courtroom? All 17 right, please allow that. 18 Okay. We'd like to proceed with the motion for relief 19 from the stay filed on behalf of creditor Michael Beydoun. 20 anyone here on that matter? Apparently not. Is there 21 anything you'd like to say on behalf of the city on this 22 matter, sir? 23 MR. ELLMAN: Well, again Jeffrey Ellman for the record from Jones, Day on behalf of the city. I don't think

25 so, Your Honor, unless you have questions since there's been 13.53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 16 of 91

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no one to present on behalf of the movant.
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        We did file an opposition which I think expresses our --
    our point of view pretty well. I'll be happy to answer any
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 4
   questions that -- that you might have.
                         The Court will take the matter under
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              THE COURT:
   advisement and issue an appropriate order.
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             MR. ELLMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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             MR. GUZALL: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I'm here on
   behalf on Beydoun. I apologize. I was in 83rd District Court.
 9
   I tried to get here, the road was closed. I thought I'd be
10
   here on time. I apologize, I just walked in.
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              THE COURT: Okay, go ahead.
             MR. GUZALL: I apologize again, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Your appearance, please, sir.
             MR. GUZALL: Raymond Guzall, Your Honor, on behalf
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16
   of Michael Beydoun.
              THE COURT: I'm sorry. I have to ask you to repeat
17
   that into the microphone this time.
             MR. GUZALL: I'm sorry, Raymond Guzall, Your Honor,
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    on behalf of Michael Beydoun.
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21
              THE COURT: Go ahead, sir.
             MR. GUZALL: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor,
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23
   briefly this is a factual inquiry as required to determine if
   the City of Detroit proceeded in bad faith or with improper
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actions when filing for bankruptcy as it relates to Mr. 3846-ijt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 17 of 91

Beydoun.

Now there are a number of questions that I'd ask this

Court to consider when making that determination if plaintiff
should be granted the relief he is requesting, including not

-- but not limited to, does this Court consider the City of

Detroit turning down the State of Michigan's offer to lease

Belle Isle prior to filing good faith or an improper act in

bad faith.

Number two, does this Court consider that Detroit filed for bankruptcy within months of hiring an emergency manager bad faith when coupled with the fact that all of the municipalities were forced to have an emergency manager went for years without filing for bankruptcy, and still had not filed for bankruptcy.

Number three, does this Court consider the fact that the City of Detroit did not assess its assets prior to filing for bankruptcy such as the Detroit Institutes of Arts, the Institute of Arts bad faith.

Number four, does this Court consider the opinion and finding of the Michigan Court of Appeals and the facts in the Michael Beydoun case illustrating that Detroit's appeals were without merit indicate that the City of Detroit's filing for appeal was merely an attempt to improperly delay paying the judgment owed for as long as they could and then file for

25 | bankruptcy. 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 18 of 91 Number five, does this Court consider the timing of Detroit's filing for bankruptcy to be indicative of bad faith as to Mr. Beydoun. Given the admissions of the Governor of the State of Michigan, Rick Snyder, and the emergency manager, Kevin Orr, that the City of Detroit was in financial ruin for decades. And I've cited to that in my brief, Your Honor, those clips, those news clippings and the audio clippings as well, Your Honor.

Number six, Governor Snyder stated that the City of

Detroit could have carried on without filing for bankruptcy.

That's at Page 6 of our brief with the audio statement of the

Governor on the news. Does this Court consider that statement

to be proof of bad faith in filing for bankruptcy by Detroit's

emergency manager who was appointed by the Governor.

Point seven, does this Court find Detroit Mayor Bing's statements in February and March of this year that Detroit did not need an emergency manager to be bad faith on the part of the City of Detroit.

Number eight, does this Court find bad faith given that
Mayor Bing met with Kevin Orr prior to an emergency manager
being appointed and purposely hid that fact that he negotiated
to save his salary along with that of his staff. We've
pointed to that in our brief as well, Your Honor.

The next point, does the Court consider Detroit's Mayor g hiring a contractor who owes back property taxes in 5-tit Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 19 of 91

Detroit good faith. Your Honor, this was a news story that hit on Channel 2 news, Charlie Leduff, posted August 26th, 2013 at MyFoxDetroit.com under Leduff, Bing's Demolition Contractor May Be Doing Business Illegally. I'd point to that as proof, Your Honor, as well.

The next point, Your Honor, does this Court consider the City of Detroit hiring 90 new employees after they filed for bankruptcy to be in bad faith. This story hit the *Detroit*News, Fox 2 News August 26th, 2013, Charlie Leduff's report.

Again, Your Honor, the actions by the City of Detroit fly in the face of their claims that they cannot pay their bills on time. Who could pay their bills on time when they are hiring more people after they file for bankruptcy and then refuse to lease property prior to filing for bankruptcy in order to earn money to pay for those bills.

Does the fact that Mr. Beydoun filed a motion for immediate consideration of Detroit's appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court on July 8th, 2013 and requested that a bond be posted and/or an immediate decision be made in his case, coupled with the fact that Detroit filed for bankruptcy just ten days later, July 18th, 2013. Does that give this Court reasoning under the totality of the circumstances by law to lift the automatic stay as to Mr. Beydoun.

Now, Your Honor, I've reviewed the response filed by the City of Detroit. They fail to address these facts as I've set 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 20 of 91

forth before you today in their totality would show bad faith as to the filing of the bankruptcy by Detroit as it applies to Mr. Beydoun.

The City of Detroit repeats in their brief multiple case law that's been cited by Mr. Beydoun and argues that Mr. Beydoun does not meet half of the guideline factors said to be meaningful in Laguna. Yet they cite to no case law requiring half or any number of points in Laguna that need to be met. Because there is no law indicating such, Your Honor. It's simply a totality -- a totality of circumstances on a case by case basis.

In addition, the City of Detroit argues at Page 10 of its brief that the <u>Beydoun v City of Detroit</u> appeal would distract the city from its efforts to restructure and further divert its scant resources. What is hiring 90 new employees doing? It's doing the same thing. They're doing this after the fact, Your Honor. It makes no sense.

Why is Mayor Bing not collecting upon outstanding property taxes? Clearly that's a simple issue. Clearly shows bad faith on the part of Detroit. They're not collecting on the property taxes yet he hires this contractor to do demolition work for him and the city paid him 1.3 million dollars as indicated in the news article by Charlie Leduff on video on the date that I mentioned.

emergency manager is running everything in the City of Detroit at \$275,000 a year. These facts show that Detroit purposely pushed itself into bankruptcy. The leasing to Belle Isle was a simple thing, Your Honor, it just wasn't done.

The facts show no payment on the part of Detroit to avoid filing for bankruptcy. A Bankruptcy Court exercises its discretion and in light of the specific facts for each case.

The <u>Laguna</u> factors cannot be applied mechanically.

Briefly, Your Honor, as to the bond issue raised by the City of Detroit in their brief. There is nothing in the statute or the Michigan Court Rule 6. -- 2.614(e) which prevents a Court from ordering that a bond be posted for any other reason, not just simply as a prerequisite for an appeal.

However, Your Honor, Mr. Beydoun requested immediate action by the Supreme Court so he could begin collection upon his judgment. And if the Court reviews the Court of Appeals decision, you will see they ordered costs against the City of Detroit and basically stated that Detroit had no case whatsoever. There was no merit to that case and it's clear that their filing in the Michigan Supreme Court was simply to delay the proceedings once again, Your Honor.

And with that, I think I've gone through all of my points. I really appreciate you taking me at this late time, Your Honor. And I again apologize for being late.

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without deciding, that what you say about the city's filing in bad faith is true, why would that entitle your client to pursue collection of his claim while all of the other people who are owed money by the city are stayed?

MR. GUZALL: Because the facts in this case specifically as to Mr. Beydoun show bad faith. The timing of
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specifically as to Mr. Beydoun show bad faith. The timing of the city's filing with the Supreme Court and the timing of the filing for bankruptcy ten days after Mr. Beydoun asked the Supreme Court for immediate relief and for a bond for the 2.2 million dollars, when you have that type of timing coupled with the facts that I've set forth, that's why we're specific to Mr. Beydoun in this case.

THE COURT: Let's assume that this filing was in response to the pressure of your client's claim.

MR. GUZALL: Sure.

THE COURT: Again without deciding.

MR. GUZALL: Sure.

THE COURT: The fact is of course that virtually every bankruptcy case that's ever filed is in response to creditor pressure. And if -- if it were the fact that creditor pressure resulted in the bankruptcy meant the bankruptcy was in bad faith, we wouldn't have any bankruptcies, would we?

MR. GUZALL: Well, if we put that in perspective,

25 Your Honor, and that's why I've given you an outline of the 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 23 of 91

fact that the Mayor -- I'm sorry, the Governor stated, along 2 with the emergency manager, the City of Detroit has been in ruins for decades. Now there have been no action taken --3 4 THE COURT: No, I -- I asked you -- I asked you 5 conceding that, why should that fact, or that set of facts, give your client a preference over all the other creditors --6 7 MR. GUZALL: Because what I'm trying to --8 THE COURT: And your answer was well, they filed 9 because my client had a claim against them. 10 MR. GUZALL: What I'm trying to impart to Your Honor, is it's not creditor pressure specifically as you're 11 stating with all of these other creditors. I'm narrowing down 12 13 to Michael Beydoun and the pressure that he put to obtain that bond and to obtain the \$2,000,000 when the city wouldn't even 14 lease Belle Isle to make some money to prevent filing for 15 16 bankruptcy. 17 Now the Governor stated, we --18 THE COURT: I get debtors who file -- well, I used Get creditors (sic) who file bankruptcy because their 19 20 home is about to be foreclosed upon, or because their car has been repossessed, or because there's a garnishment. Those 21 aren't all in bad faith, are they? 22 23 MR. GUZALL: You cannot liquidate the assets of a

25 situation. In those cases, Your Honor, you can go in and 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 24 of 91

city. It's -- that's why this is a different unique

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1
    liquidate.
         Here Mr. Beydoun can't ask the Court, please, Your Honor,
 2
    sell this building so I can get my money. It doesn't work
 3
 4
    that way with a city. That's the uniqueness of this type of
 5
    case.
 6
         And the Governor can't come in and say well, we could
 7
   have kicked the can down the road another few years but you
   know what, we're going to file now. Well, why are they filing
9
   now when he says they could have kicked the can down the road
    for years and says Detroit was in financial ruins for decades.
10
    Why now, Your Honor?
11
12
         Now in these specific facts, if you take everything I've
13
    said as accurate --
14
              THE COURT: Just a second, and do me a favor.
15
              MR. GUZALL: Sure.
16
              THE COURT: See that microphone right there in front
17
    of you?
18
              MR. GUZALL: Yes.
              THE COURT: Move it about six inches closer to me.
19
20
   Maybe a little bit more. A little bit more this way.
21
              MR. GUZALL: Toward you?
22
              THE COURT: Yeah.
23
              MR. GUZALL: Okay. All right, better?
24
              THE COURT: Go ahead.
25 | I'm sorry. Your Ho
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these specific facts as to Michael Beydoun, that's what we're asking the Court to focus in on. Mr. Beydoun knows all the other creditors out there.

And it's a travesty as a side note that people who have worked all their life in the City of Detroit are now at odds with being able to obtain their pensions. We understand that and we get that.

We're asking the Court to focus in on just the particular facts as they lay out. And if the Court follows those facts as to this case, the Court can easily make the determination that Mr. Beydoun is entitled to the relief requested and move forward on his case and with collection as he should have been allowed to do. Given all of these incidents of what the city's done lining up with his motion, the Supreme Court when they did it, how they did it, what they said, how they've acted. All of these line up in a totality of circumstances as to Mr. Beydoun.

I don't know the circumstances what everybody else who has a judgment in the City of Detroit. All I know is these facts on this case allow this Court to make the determination and the relief requested by my client.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. GUZALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. ELLMAN: For the record, Your Honor, Jeffrey

very brief unless the Court has questions or comments.

Obviously we have a number of lift stay matters as a fundamental importance to the city to -- to preserve the benefit supported by the automatic stay and minimize the distraction, disruption, and costs of these various matters while we're -- we're pursuing substantial work for the restructuring and trying to pursue a fair adjudication adjustment of debts.

I think that what happened here is that there was the happenstance of the filing in the midst of what was a meaningful part of this litigation with the movant. I don't think this is anything like what you see in the Laguna case which is the case cited about bad faith. Bad faith being the only allegation of cause to lift the stay for that kind of a -- a basic lift of stay under the factors cited there has to be something much different than -- than what we have in front of us today.

That was a case about one creditor, one asset. This is a obviously a much different situation we've outlined in our papers. I don't want to belabor it. I think the Court's made some good points already. I'll be happy to answer any questions. We obviously would request that the motion be denied.

THE COURT: Thank you. The Court will take this er advisement and issue a written opinion and order. 6-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 27 of 9

1 MR. ELLMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 2 MR. GUZALL: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Let's turn our attention now to 3 4 the comments regarding -- or comments on the order regarding 5 eligibility objections. Again, I want to -- I want to begin by thanking all of you who took the time to share with the 6 7 Court your comments regarding its order. 8 It may surprise you to hear as it surprised me to come to 9 the conclusion that I actually agreed with a lot of what you 10 said. There are really just two or three points that we have to have further discussions on. 11 12 So what I'd like to do is go through those items that you have raised that are acceptable to me, at least in principle. And then we'll talk about the ones that need further 14 discussion. 15 16 So for example, there were several comments to the effect 17 that the proposed time allowed for your oral arguments was 18 insufficient. And I think there was even a suggestion by someone for an additional 90 minutes for the opening arguments 19 20 and 30 minute -- an additional 30 minutes for the rebuttal. 21 That's fine with me. So unless anyone wants to state anything further on that issue, we can move along. 22 23 MR. ELLMAN: Your Honor, that's to both sides?

25 MR. ELLMAN: Nothing further 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 28 of 91

THE COURT: Yes.

24

THE COURT: Okay, good. The UAW comment was concerned that the Court neglected to include its objection on the grounds of bad faith. The Court will of course make that correction as well.

1.3

Two or three of the comments suggested that the Court include a specific provision in the order to the effect that an argument, or an objection I should say, that's raised in the written objection to eligibility is not waived if it is not verbally argued because of the way you've decided to split up the arguments. And again I think that's a perfectly appropriate provision to include. One of the comments even included proposed language which looked fine to me, so I will make that addition to the order as well.

Two or three of the objections suggested that time was needed by the objecting parties after the city's response to coordinate the rebuttal argument and even potentially to have the rebuttal argument on a different day, perhaps even the next day. Again, I have no objection to that if it's -- if it's the consensus of the objecting parties that that is something you'd like to do and need to do, that's fine with me. Is it?

MS. CECCOTTI: Your Honor, I think with respect to coordination, that would be fine whether we'd take the next day.

1 record, so --2 MS. CECCOTTI: I should go to the microphone. THE COURT: Yes, please. 3 4 MS. CECCOTTI: Your Honor, Babette Ceccotti, Cohen, 5 Weiss, and Simon for the UAW. The opportunity to coordinate is -- is fine. We may want to decide among ourselves whether 6 7 we think the next day is -- is needed or not. But --8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MS. CECCOTTI: And that's --10 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you to do that. nominate one of you to speak for your group and -- and let me 11 12 know. Because I would like this, if it's going to be the next day, to include that in the order itself. Okay. So perhaps over a break or at some point you can discuss that among 14 15 yourselves. 16 The retirement systems comment number 770 identified a 17 mistake that we made in Paragraph 12 or maybe even a couple of 18 mistakes. And we will of course correct that as well. 19 AFSCME's comment was concerned about the possibility that 20 the -- the order -- or the language in the order might in some way limit the scope of its objections and therefore proposed that its sub objections or sub arguments be included actually in the form of the order. 23 24 So let me ask in that regard, Ms. Levine, if it would be

sufficient for the Court simply to state in the order that 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 30 of 91

we're talking about here, that all of the specific objections and arguments in support of those objections are incorporated by reference and that there is no intent to limit any of the arguments by the sort of shorthand summary language that I used. Would that be acceptable to you?

MS. LEVINE: Yes, Your Honor. Sharon Levine, Lowenstein, Sandler for AFSCME.

To the extent you were just re-writing the table of contents, that's fine. But to the extent we're concerned the arguments were actually being limited, you've alleviated that concern.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LEVINE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. While you're -- wait. The

UAW argument or a comment requested that its objection be

added to the list of those parties who had asserted what I'll

call <u>Webster</u> objections. And by that I mean the argument that

the <u>Webster</u> decision collaterally estops the city from

re-litigating the issue.

I actually did not see that argument made in the UAW's objection. What I saw was a citation to <u>Webster</u> as precedent -- precedent for the legal argument being made, not in -- not as the basis for a collateral estoppel argument.

MS. CECCOTTI: Your Honor, I think that the -- I

25 think that Your Honor's comments on that particular point go 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 31 of 91

to, I guess, a broader question. Not unlike the one that you just discussed with -- with -- with Ms. Levine regarding the extent to which the order in our view carves up the objection in a way that leaves the parties, or at least for the UAW, uncertain as to actually where its arguments fit.

So I suppose what I would say in general, because I gather we're going to be discussing some additional items as well, and I'll reserve my comments for then, that a -- a solution if you will similar to the one that you just discussed with -- with Ms. Levine would be acceptable to us and perhaps we don't need to decide right now the contours of any --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CECCOTTI: -- any objecting party's objection.

THE COURT: That's a good response. Thank you.

So as -- as I cull through your comments, the two comments that I thought we needed to have a further and more substantive discussion about were first, the statements in several of the comments that discovery is needed on the issues that the Court A, had identified as legal issues, and B, later in the order prohibited discovery on.

And the second issue I think we need to further discuss is the comment in one or more of the papers that an extension of the dates that the Court has said should be considered. So

address why discovery is needed on the issues that the Court has described as legal issues and/or why they are not just legal issues, they are also factual issues. Ms. Levine.

MS. LEVINE: Thank you, Your Honor. We would. We also -- and in that context there's also a third issue that we would like to raise which maybe perhaps we just didn't state clearly. In addition to the fact that we're looking for more time which is the speed issue which we'll get to. And we'll address the discovery issue.

Part of the reason for discovery is that you learn more about your case during discovery which to the extent that we did not include specifically, and that's just part of the colloquy you were just having with other counsel as well. A specific legal argument, or a specific factual argument in the response to the eligibility objection, we'd respectfully submit that it should be appropriate to have it heard in connection with the trial.

What we have here is, you know, the -- the city filed its eligibility petition and the -- and its brief. We filed responses which is sort of like the answer or -- or a motion to dismiss if you will.

But we haven't yet had the discovery. So to say we're bound by a trial brief or a summary judgment brief that was drafted before discovery concludes without any ability to

25 augment and/or clarify the issues, we respectfully submit is 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 33 of 91

also prejudicial.

1.3

Turning to discovery --

THE COURT: Well, let's -- let's deal with that question right now since you've raised it. My -- my view on that is that there is a procedure for the amendment of pleadings. And that's the procedure that ought to be used when you seek to assert objections beyond that which were asserted initially.

So it might be for example your motion to amend your objection to add the following objection. And you would state the grounds that the law sets forth for such an amendment. Do you have any objection to following that kind of procedure in that circumstance?

MS. LEVINE: May I consult with other counsel?

THE COURT: Please.

MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, and I'm sure I'll be corrected if I misunderstood. But I think the consensus is and frankly we agree, that ordinarily the order is you have discovery and then there's a period for dispositive motions.

Our concern is, you know, and we're running into it a little bit which will be the next issue that we discuss. But we're going to get limited on other discovery as well if in fact it's not expressly stated in the objection and there's no right or expectation that we clean up the pleadings the way

you normally would expect at the end of any discovery period 13.53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 34 of 91

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1
    in any litigation.
 2
              THE COURT: Uh-huh.
              MS. LEVINE: Prior to trial and prior to opening
 3
 4
    argument. So rather than seriatim amendments and questions
 5
    with regard to whether or not there is discovery that relate
    to those amendments --
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Okay.
 8
              MS. LEVINE: -- it might make sense to go through
 9
    the witnesses that we've been working with the city to
    schedule one at a time and then everybody cleans up their
10
11
    pleadings and then we take it from the next step from there.
12
              THE COURT: So you would contemplate a date by which
13
    amended objections would be filed prior to the hearing.
              MS. LEVINE: Yes, Your Honor.
14
              THE COURT: All right. Well, let's hold on --
15
16
              MS. LEVINE: And I guess that goes back a little bit
17
    into the timing because the question becomes prior to what
18
    hearing.
19
              THE COURT: Right.
20
              MS. LEVINE: If we're bound by the oral argument and
21
    only the --
22
              THE COURT: Right.
23
              MS. LEVINE: -- legal objections, we may --
24
              THE COURT: Right. So let's -- let's hold on that
         ion until we have the discussion about what the sched
t Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 35 of
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will be. Okay.

MS. LEVINE: Now turning to discovery. Your Honor, there are certain arguments that we've made that we do agree are strictly legal with regard to -- to constitutional issues. However, there are other arguments that we've made that we respectfully submit include factual inquiry.

And those are as applied constitutional arguments or good faith. And they -- and they blur. And we're -- we respectfully submit we need discovery on both. And the problem is if we just get discovery from the emergency manager and the city, we don't get the factual basis, the who, what, why, when, and how the Governor and the state made the decisions it made that led up to this filing which were not simply authorize and be done with.

So we'd respectfully submit that we do need fact discovery with regard to those issues from the state. And I'm -- and I'm bleeding, I think, into the motion to quash. With Your Honor's permission, I guess we should go there or -- apparently not.

THE COURT: I guess -- I guess not.

MS. LEVINE: But the -- but dealing just with the factual inquiry. And -- and whether you call it good faith or whether you call it appropriate authorization, the problem is what happens at the government at the state level, at the

25 | Governor's -- in the Governor's office with the Governor's 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 36 of 91

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1
    advisors is critical to having to pursue this motion.
 2
              THE COURT: Well, let me -- let me -- let me reopen
   the question that got vetoed here just a moment ago. Which is
 3
 4
   if the Court determines that the motion to quash should be
   denied because it finds that the discovery that you seek from
 5
   the stay that its officers is relevant to the issue of bad
 6
 7
   faith, does that solve this problem?
 8
             MS. LEVINE: It solve -- Your Honor, it solves the
 9
   problem with regard to discovery. We're still grappling with
   how we characterize the -- I don't want to forego -- I'm going
10
   back to whether Your Honor is just re-writing my table of
11
12
   contents or whether I'm losing arguments at the time of the
13
   hearing.
14
             THE COURT: Right.
             MS. LEVINE: So the answer is that --
15
16
              THE COURT: Well, I -- I don't want anyone to lose
17
   any arguments. So --
18
             MS. LEVINE: So the answer is if you deny --
              THE COURT: I want to be very sensitive to that
19
20
    issue.
21
             MS. LEVINE: If you deny the motion to quash and the
22
   facts come out that we present regardless of whether they fall
23
   into the silo --
24
              THE COURT: Uh-huh.
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25 | MS. LEVINE: - of good faith or some other silo, 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 37 of 91

we think they're in one silo and Your Honor concludes they're in a different silo, that's fine so long as --

THE COURT: But look, I -- I split these up only in an effort to make the process as efficient as possible. If there's a specific issue that its advocate thinks goes in the factual category rather than the legal category, this is not of -- of great concern to me.

I think it -- we have to deal with it sooner or later.

So, you know, it's -- to me the issue isn't when to deal with the issue. The issue is, is it something you really need discovery on or not. Does that make sense to you?

So I guess the issue is why do you need discovery on the issue for example of whether the filing was authorized. It clearly was authorized.

MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, we respectfully submit that we don't necessarily agree with that. And if we're turning to the motion to quash, that's the -- that's -- that's embedded in that issue. But if we're not, there -- there are a couple of things that happened at the time of the authorization. Or the purported authorization.

Okay. We're concerned about number one, the timing of the authorization, not necessarily for the reasons that were set forth in the arguments in connection with the stay motion that Your Honor just heard, but it did appear to be motivated

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1
   pre-bankruptcy negotiations that we've seen in virtually every
 2
   other Chapter 9 case which extended for a longer period of
   time than Detroit despite the fact that Detroit is the
 3
 4
   largest.
 5
         Okay. It seemed to have also been motivated perhaps by
   forum shopping. We're allowed to inquire into that analysis.
 6
 7
   Two, they seem to --
 8
              THE COURT: Okay. But stop there. Aren't both of
 9
   those issues already fully encompassed by other factual issues
   that we've identified, including your assertion of bad faith
10
    and your assertion that there were not the required
11
12
   pre-petition good faith negotiations.
13
             MS. LEVINE: If -- if the Court's saying that we get
14
   depositions at the state level based upon the theory of good
   faith and we've also reserved our rights as we've previously
15
16
   discussed with regard to reshaping the issues if and when it
17
   becomes appropriate.
18
             THE COURT: Uh-huh.
19
             MS. LEVINE: I can be done.
20
              THE COURT: Well, I haven't quite gotten there yet.
21
   But let's see what happens with the motion to quash and then
22
   maybe we'll have to reopen this or not. Okay?
23
             MS. LEVINE: Thank you.
24
              THE COURT: Ms. Ceccotti.
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25 | MS. CECCOTTI: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 39 of 91 I guess -- I guess I'd like to again emphasize, or emphasize if I haven't already, that the -- and -- and we certainly understand that the number of objections and the scope of the objections presents certain case management challenges. I don't think any of us here is going to deny that, it would be foolish of us to deny that some -- some sort of case management process, you know, should be -- should be attempted here.

But messing around with discovery is -- is -- is going to in the -- in the end, create more problems than -- than it's going to solve. First of all, there is going to be -- there's just going to be more disputes. I can -- I can see it now.

I don't expect to be in those depositions other -- others in my office will be. We're going to have objection after objection about scope. It is going to take up the parties' time. It will inevitably take up Your Honor's time. And we know Your Honor's rules specifically discourage discovery motions.

So in the long run the need to try to manage the process is probably going to be overcome by just an overwhelming number of -- of disputes over discovery unless we simply let the federal rules operate as they do. And what that means is, we filed our objections, we've now had the city's response. We are entitled, the objecting parties are entitled to

discovery on any matter relevant to any claim or defense. 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 40 of 91

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1
    And --
              THE COURT: Well, but let me ask you, you know, in
 2
    all good faith are any of the issues that I have identified as
 3
 4
    legal issues in your view legal issues on which no discovery
 5
    is necessary?
 6
              MS. CECCOTTI: It is quite possible, Your Honor,
 7
   that at the end of the discovery process we may well find that
 8
   there is a list for which there are simply no disputed facts,
9
    or for which no -- no -- even undisputed facts need to be
    argued. But the orderly progression is to --
10
11
              THE COURT: So you're not willing to concede that
12
   now.
13
              MS. CECCOTTI: I don't see how I can without running
   the risk --
14
15
              THE COURT: The constitutionality of Chapter 9 of
    the Bankruptcy Code is subject to discovery.
17
              MS. CECCOTTI: Well, Your Honor, I guess our -- our
18
    formulation of it was slightly different as you know. We
19
    formulated it in a slightly different manner. It is -- it is
20
    entirely possible that we --
              THE COURT: Actually, I'm not aware -- I'm not aware
21
22
   of that.
23
              MS. CECCOTTI: -- could argue the --
24
              THE COURT: How -- how did you formulate it
    different from that?
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1 MS. CECCOTTI: As applied. The -- the 2 constitutionality of Chapter 9 as applied depends upon the -the proper operation of dual sovereignty principles. It is 3 4 quite possible, Your Honor, that we will not discover any 5 facts that will change the way we have framed that argument one way or another. As you know we have taken issue with --6 7 with setting up the argument weeks in advance of the trial 8 anyway and it's precisely for this reason. 9 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 10 MS. CECCOTTI: We are very concerned that we are 11 going to --12 THE COURT: Okay. So what you would prefer is 13 discovery followed by a moment where you would identify the issues that can be argued without a trial, followed by a 14 trial, followed by a process to resolve those issues. 16 MS. CECCOTTI: Yes. Not -- not unlike the process 17 you were describing a little -- a little bit before with Ms. 18 Levine where at the end of that --19 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 20 MS. CECCOTTI: -- there is some sort of amendment or clean up of the pleadings. 22 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay. 23 MS. CECCOTTI: And during that process --24 THE COURT: All right.

25 | MS. CECCOTTI: -- we could then identi 13 53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38

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set a separate date if Your Honor would like to handle it that
 2
    way --
 3
              THE COURT: Uh-huh.
 4
              MS. CECCOTTI: -- on those issues.
 5
              THE COURT: Uh-huh.
              MS. CECCOTTI: Otherwise we just think that it is
 6
 7
    too -- it's A, disruptive, but B, disruptive of -- of -- of
 8
    the Court processes but also disruptive frankly of our ability
 9
    to present our case in an orderly manner.
10
              THE COURT: Uh-huh.
              MS. CECCOTTI: To simply foreclose the discovery
11
12
    prematurely.
13
              THE COURT: Thank you.
              MR. GORDON: Good morning, Your Honor. For the
14
    record, Robert Gordon of Clark, Hill on behalf of the Detroit
15
16
    Retirement Systems.
17
         Your Honor, just to elaborate on the discussion that's
    just been had. You know, our feeling is that while there may
19
    be distinct legal issues that the Court can -- can address at
20
    an appropriate point in time separate from the issues that
21
    have been reserved to October 23, and we respect the idea of
22
    -- of separating those things for the Court's efficiency, the
23
    -- the problem simply is that until discovery has been
    completed, it's very difficult to know whether there are any
    facts that might be implicated on the issue. 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 43 of 91
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1 THE COURT: I just don't accept that. I just -- I 2 just do not accept that. I think there are facts that everyone knows are undisputed and that there are legal issues 3 4 that can be resolved without any discovery or the need to 5 resolve factual disputes. MR. GORDON: Your Honor, we respectfully disagree. 6 7 We think that there -- we just got the city's response --8 THE COURT: Well, I'll ask you the same question I 9 just asked Ms. Ceccotti. The constitutionality of Chapter 9. What possible facts in the case are there that would relate to that, let alone disputed facts other than the fact that the 11 city filed a Chapter 9 case. I know, it's a hard question, 13 isn't it? 14 MR. GORDON: Well, it's a difficult question, but I 15 think -- I think the way things are implemented can make a 16 difference. There's constitutionality as well as --17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. GORDON: -- constitutionality as applied. So I 19 think as applied could really turn on how a statute is 20 applied. 21 To me, Your Honor, discovery should happen first. 22 not going to shorten the overall process if the hearing on the 23 18th were adjourned for say two weeks, or something like that --24

25 | THE COURT: Uh-huh. 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 44 of 91

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1
             MR. GORDON: -- and still held.
 2
             THE COURT: Uh-huh.
             MR. GORDON: There wouldn't be any prejudice to
 3
 4
    anyone and we wouldn't have to be guessing about what facts
 5
    actually may have some impact on -- on the overall issues.
 6
              THE COURT: Okay.
 7
             MR. GORDON:
                           Thank you, Your Honor.
 8
             THE COURT: That's a fair comment.
 9
             MR. GORDON: Thank you, Your Honor.
10
             THE COURT: Anyone else? Yes, sir.
11
             MR. WERTHEIMER: William Wertheimer, Your Honor, on
12
   behalf of the Robbie Flowers and the other plaintiffs from one
1.3
   of the three State Court cases.
14
         Your Honor, in that State Court --
15
              THE COURT: Your comments repeated your eligibility
16
    objections.
17
             MR. WERTHEIMER: Well, except that we made clear in
18
   our comments that our State Court lawsuit and our objections
19
   to eligibility were based on facts. That is that we were
20
   making an argument that the eligibility issue should be
   decided based on the facts as -- as others have said as
21
22
   applied.
23
             THE COURT: Fair enough.
24
             MR. WERTHEIMER: And we made that clear in our
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objections and we think that it makes sense that 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38

discovery before you decide whether you can decide the issue of whether the filing was consistent with Article 9, Section 24 of the state constitution.

That you shouldn't decide in the abstract that this is purely a legal issue. We have pled it both in State Court and in our objections as a factual issue and we think that we're entitled to discovery on it. Thank you.

MR. MONTGOMERY: Good morning, Your Honor. Claude
Montgomery for Dentons on behalf of the retiree committee. I
rise for two simple propositions in connection with the
discussion of discovery.

First, to advise the Court that after consideration the retiree committee will be filing an objection to eligibility today, the $13^{\rm th}$ day after our retention was confirmed.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MONTGOMERY: In that regard, we have come to believe that the discoverable, we say arguably undisputed, but nonetheless discoverable intentions of the Governor, the Treasurer, and the emergency manager with respect to their purpose in authorizing the filing, specifically whether or not the purpose of the filing was to avoid Article 24 -- excuse me, Article 9, Section 24 of the Michigan Constitution.

Because we believe if that was a purpose and if this

Court were to find that notwithstanding that purpose there was

into play and not before. And so, Your Honor, we simply rise to support the notion that the objectors which we'll include ourselves as of tomorrow morning, be allowed as fulsome discovery as possible before Your Honor finally determines what the shape of the pleadings are on which you are going to make a ruling.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Ms. Brimer.

MS. BRIMER: Good morning, Your Honor. Lynn M. Brimer appearing on behalf of the Retired Detroit Police Members Association.

Your Honor, at the risk of repeating what the Court has heard, I would like to just point out that discovery under the federal rules is intended to be extremely broad. The Court's order now has created an opportunity for unnecessary discovery disputes as is evidenced by the motion to quash that perhaps are unnecessary.

The -- the constitutionality for example of the Chapter 9 may in fact, Your Honor, be strictly a legal issue. With respect to discovery, we certainly don't want to be in a dispute on discovery matters whether or not constitutionality of Chapter 9 is legal or not and have the parties raising those issues during discovery. Those matters should be raised at the conclusion of what should be extremely broad discovery, Your Honor.

1 MR. BENNETT: Good morning -- morning, Your Honor. 2 Bruce Bennett of Jones, Day on behalf of the city. At the outset, I want to applaud Your Honor's use of Rule 3 4 1, to fashion procedures that can streamline litigation. 5 my --THE COURT: Would you just move the mike a little 6 7 closer to you? 8 MR. BENNETT: Sure, is that better? 9 THE COURT: A little more. 10 MR. BENNETT: Is that better? 11 THE COURT: There you go, yes. 12 MR. BENNETT: Okay. In -- in my formative years a 13 District Judge told me that Rule 1 was the most important rule in the Rule of Civil Procedures. And over time I think I've 14 15 come to agree with him more and more. 16 Second point, even more important than the first. We are 17 supportive of any procedures that Your Honor wants to adopt that will make it easier for Your Honor to work through the 18 very long list of objections that have been leveled to the 19 20 city's eligibility. 21 What is important to us more than anything else is that 22 the process conclude as rapidly as possible and -- and aiming for the end of October as Your Honor's schedule appears to do 23 works well for other things that are going on in the case.

And we -- and whatever adjustments that Your Honor makes we 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 48 of 91

would hope that that doesn't change.

We find it helpful to break down the list as much as possible because it's difficult I think for you, and difficult for us, to stand here and deal with 30 items in opening 30 items in opposition, 30 items in -- in reply. And so to -- to the extent that this can be broken into smaller pieces and the -- and the legal versus issues that cannot be resolved solely as a matter of law, distinction is a distinction that actually accomplishes this goal and I think it accomplishes the goal quite nicely. Because it limits the number of topics that we'll have to handle at any particular session.

Now, I think that the objectors misstate what I think

Your Honor was trying to do which is there are issues here

that the city believes, and frankly it's many if you've read

our papers and I don't know that you have yet. The hearing is

quite far away.

But there are many issues that we have dealt with by saying they may be resolved as matters of law. And as to which we regard open paren either no facts -- either (1) no facts are disputed or (2), no facts are material.

And the way it frequently works in arguments on summary judgment, which this first round of hearings could be analogized to, is that one party, sometimes both, but one party asserts that a matter can be dealt with as a matter of

the party asserting that it can be resolved solely as a matter of law, other times the Court doesn't.

And if we ran into that situation and the Court decided $\\ \text{after an allegation of fact is made} \ --$

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. BENNETT: -- that it actually is material to the issue at hand or is disputed and may or may not therefore turn the issue at hand, the issue or that part of the argument can be deferred to the next day.

And so we can come to the hearing with the expectation that yes, it's going to be asserted by one party, mostly the city, that a number of the issues that have been asserted whether or not they've been wrapped in facts, are issues that can be resolved as a matter of law and we in fact can consolidate considerably the number of issues that would have to be determined at a subsequent hearing where facts are involved.

And so for that reason, we think that Your Honor's bifurcation with a tentative list of issues that might be determined as a matter of law is a very sensible way to go and does -- does no violence to anyone's legitimate expectations or rights whatsoever. Well within what's contemplated by Rule 1.

I want to make one more comment about something that

where we are on the map.

The city filed its opening papers actually together with the petition date. Oppositions were due on a particular day. And at the request I think of Mr. Gordon, but of the objectors, Your Honor added an additional response by the city in advance of the trial brief. And I think actually that helped a lot because we were able to deal with issues again that we think are issues that can be resolved as a matter of law.

We, of course, know that there will be new briefs that will come out with factual issues that -- or facts that are now known because of newly discovered evidence. And we discussed that at the very beginning when -- when the procedures were being discussed. It's of course sensible, it has to happen and those papers come at the conclusion of discovery.

What I'm hearing though is that in addition to that the objectors want an opportunity to re-write their objections in response to our reply papers.

THE COURT: Well, in response to the discovery that they get in the meantime.

MR. BENNETT: Which -- right. But so again it -- if -- I'm for all the procedures and any procedure that Your Honor will find helpful. But if instead of having a round of

25 papers that are really about facts that -- that the objectors 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 51 of 91

want is another round of papers that are about the issues we think are about law really a sur reply to our reply brief, I feel myself compelled to ask at least for the opportunity to figure out whether we need an opportunity for further briefing to deal with such things.

We dealt with the objections that were filed. They were quite voluminous and there were many many topics and I apologize for the length of the brief that resulted as a -- to respond to all of that. We'll do -- we'll do it again if we -- if we need to. I'm hoping to avoid it. With that, I'll leave -- I'm here to answer any questions that Your Honor might have.

THE COURT: Thank you. By the way in the list of things I -- I went through earlier regarding comments that I agreed to, I neglected one which was -- one second. In AFSCME's comment there was the concern that the Court reworded the stern issue from jurisdiction to authority and it needs to be stayed in terms of jurisdiction. Again, that's fine with the Court. The Court will make that change.

MS. CECCOTTI: Your Honor, I'm not sure if you have others on your list but I did want to point out that one -- one thing that you and I haven't discussed is our comments regarding our (c)(4) objection. So if you wanted to take those up.

25 | THE COURT: Yeah. Well, okay, sure, go ahead. 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 52 of 91

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MS. CECCOTTI: Well, again our -- and again I think some of the comments that -- that we've already heard, and I -- and I've already stated previously apply as well. Just in essence we feel that just following the orderly progression, we -- the UAW should be permitted to keep that objection alive and continue to litigate it.

At the end of the day it may be that Your Honor's initial ruling is correct, but frankly there is such a relative lack of case law in Chapter 9 that I'm really not prepared today to say that based on what's out there today, there is no possible way that we could convince you based upon either the trial process or some dispositive process, dispositive motion or argument process that takes place later on, that we couldn't convince you that in fact the (c)(4) objection on these set of facts is a viable one. And therefore we respectfully ask Your Honor to withdraw your ruling on that at — at this time.

THE COURT: All right. I assume others of you have joined in that request and support that request as well.

Okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ MONTGOMERY: If I may interrupt. Disclosure and consideration about how to respond to --

THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. Go ahead.

MR. MONTGOMERY: All right. Just the last point,
Your Honor. Just for the purposes of disclosure and

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It is our expectation that following the filing of our objection to the city's eligibility papers that because we and others have raised both state and federal constitutional issues, we will be filing a motion to withdraw the reference. And we will also be filing a motion to this Court to stay your proceedings pending the District Court's decision on whether or not the reference should be withdrawn.

And we were going to put in an ex parte request for a Thursday or Friday hearing on that request. So if you would fold that into your thinking, it would be appreciated, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm feeling the need to turn our attention to the motion to quash and then circle back to the issue of the scope of discovery and the timing of the various hearings that have been set. So who would like to be heard from the Attorney General's office on the motion to quash?

MS. NELSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Assistant Attorney General Margaret A. Nelson on behalf of the state with respect to its motion to quash. I appreciate the opportunity to address the Court on this.

We filed a response brief yesterday that essentially outlines our legal arguments with respect to why in addition to the objections stated in the original motion to quash, the

September 3rd order to establish either the necessity or requirement for the discovery they are seeking from these highest executive officials of the State of Michigan.

THE COURT: This is your privilege argument?

MS. NELSON: This is part of the privilege argument, but it also initially is the relevance. I would submit to the Court that examination of the responses.

First, the objections filed by AFSCME on September 1st do not establish any relevance with respect to the required or the requested deposition testimony, or at least that one might imply from their response.

Particularly I refer the Court to document 701(12)(3) where they discuss essentially the timings and the issues related to the <u>Webster</u> case which we identified in our brief. But for example, that is — is hardly relevant to the bad faith issue, number one.

Number two, they can obtain those records that are necessary to address those particular issues, they're a matter of record in the Circuit Court, and -- and otherwise obtainable from other than the State of Michigan.

So for example they allege the petition was filed in the dark of night. Well, that's clearly not true because the petition itself indicates when it was filed, the date and the time. The Court's orders that were entered for example on the

 $25 \mid 18^{th}$ of July indicate they were all -- they were entered at 13.53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 55 of 91

4:25 p.m. which was after the petition was filed.

The order in <u>Webster</u> that the creditors are relying on for collateral estoppel purposes wasn't entered until the following day, July 19th. That order is also a matter of record and available. And because the party, the objectors quote from it extensively and rely on it in their objections, they clearly already possess it. So I have to assume that they possess all of these other arguments as well.

The other factors that the -- that they don't point the Court to, which is also relevant, are the Court of Appeals actions. The emergency appeal that was filed on the 19th, the order of stay that was entered by the Court of Appeals, all of which of course are matters of public record.

So their inquiry into the status of these cases at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, is completely irrelevant at this point of time. They have access to that information. The pleadings that they've already filed in the form of objections to the eligibility clearly indicate they know that, they have possession of those orders, and there's no purpose to try to obtain it separately from the State of Michigan.

Now with respect to the good faith issue, Your Honor, I would submit they have failed dramatically all three to identify appropriately what the parameters of the bad faith issue are. And I would submit to the Court that in order to 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 56 of 91

determine the relevance of the balance of the discovery that's being requested here, a determination of what constitutes bad faith with respect to this filing under 921, has to be determined. Because the parameters of the bad faith will then determine what fact issues are relevant to that.

And I would submit to you, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Well, but doesn't the case law require the Court in addressing an -- an argument that a case was filed in bad faith, to look at the totality of circumstances, meaning everything that led up to the filing?

MS. NELSON: On the part of the debtor, Your Honor. But how is for example, and I -- the Governor's motive for signing the authorization at the time he signed it, which the Court already acknowledged this morning, the authorization has been made.

But what the plaintiffs -- I'm sorry, what the creditors want to inquire into is the Governor's motive. Why he signed it. Why he signed it the way that he did in terms of the contents. Why there were no contingencies put on it.

Because they claim the fact that there were no contingencies or a carve out for the pensions, violates

Michigan's Constitution, not that it establishes bad faith on the part of the debtor in terms of the filing. Because the authorization does not mandate a timing for the filing.

25 | So the two simply do not relate. So the Governor's 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 57 of 91

decisions and processes in deciding --

THE COURT: The Governor gave his permission for the filing.

MS. NELSON: That's correct.

THE COURT: Why isn't everything that he considered in granting that authorization relevant to the issue of the good faith of the filing?

MS. NELSON: Well, that's not what they're asking for though, Your Honor. If you look at AFSCME's -- for example, AFSCME's objections in 701 Paragraphs 17 and 18.

They're seeking the Governor's deliberative process in terms of his motive and his decision making process. His, not in relation to the totality or the circumstances that existed in the city or the information provided them, but his as to why specifically he did not include contingencies. Contingencies that weren't mandated by the law.

So it doesn't go to the petition or the filing. It goes to his decision making process, his deliberative process in deciding this is how I'm going to format this authorization.

And I've decided as he set forth in the authorization, there is no need for contingencies by me because the law controls here.

That is the Governor's motive and the Governor's deliberative process which does not relate in coincident time to the timing of the petition, or the filing of the petition, 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 58 of 91

or the emergency manager's ultimate decision that the petition has to be filed. Because the authorization doesn't mandate the filing. And it doesn't dictate the timing of the filing.

And so how does it lend itself to that totality of what they're claiming is bad faith other than the fact that the Governor authorized it based on the recommendation made by the emergency manager. Which is a matter also of public record.

It's the recommendation that was required under Section 18(1) of the statute. It's been attached to the filing. So it's a matter of public record as to the information provided on which the Governor acted and signed the authorization.

Similarly, Your Honor, the UAW objections -- or I'm sorry, the UAW's subpoenas which seek 12 specific items of documentation as well as the Governor's dep, all -- are all looking at this question of the authorization. Not specifically or in relation to the bad faith, but in relation to their constitutional challenge whether or not 436 is unconstitutional, and whether or not the authorization is invalid because it doesn't apply the Michigan Constitution.

They want again the Governor's deliberative process, not in the context of informing the debtor's decisions that relate to the bad faith issue, but in terms of the relationship to the constitutional issues. And that is where the relevance issue comes into play.

Detroit Police Members Association. Now when you look at the scope of what's being requested from the Retirees Association, from the UAW, and from AFSCME, that also lends itself to the relevance argument.

Because as the Court -- the 6th Circuit said in <u>Stockton</u>, the focus on eligibility determinations and the eligibility issue is pre-bankruptcy actions and conduct. Every one of these requests seeks in addition to pre-filing, all the post-filing communications, documents which is not the focus of the eligibility.

AFSCME's -- I'm sorry, the UAW's request goes back to September 1st of 2012. AFSCME places no parameters on it other than they want everything. And the Detroit Police Retiree Member Association wants everything pre and post. So that alone is sufficient to at least focus those document requests on the limited period of time if the Court determines that what's being requested is relevant.

The totality of the circumstances, yes. But the circumstances related to the Governor's motive, irrelevant.

Also, I wanted to address the issue of waiver briefly, Your Honor. If you -- unless you have any other questions.

I believe our brief speaks for itself. The objections are overly broad -- I'm sorry, the requests are overly broad in this context because they don't speak to good faith. They

25 speak only to the Governor's motive. They speak to the 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 60 of 91

Governor's and his staff and aides' deliberative process which is not discoverable. It's specifically privileged.

THE COURT: Can you explain to the Court why you didn't assert the privilege objection in your motion that you filed last week?

MS. NELSON: Absolutely. Because it wasn't apparent from the discovery that that was clearly what they were after, number one. Number two, we had to have an opportunity to look at the documentation and see just exactly what we were talking about.

When AFSCME filed its objection to our motion to quash on September $1^{\rm st}$, it became apparent that's exactly what they wanted. When you look at their Paragraphs 14 and 15, there is absolutely no question, they want the deliberative process of the Governor. Number three, our motion was essentially formed under the umbrella of relevance based on the Court's August $26^{\rm th}$ order which is a perfectly appropriate objection to start with under Rule 26(c).

So we have to first determine what is relevant that we have to produce what it is that they're seeking before we can then assert a privilege. Because as the Court knows, I'm sure, you assert privilege specifically, not generally and -- and in a broad context. You have to --

THE COURT: All right. Pause there. Do you seek a

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these creditors seek is protected by one or more of these
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   privileges?
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             MS. NELSON: We seek a ruling from the Court
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   today --
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              THE COURT: That would be a yes or no question,
   Ma'am.
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             MS. NELSON: The answer is no.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MS. NELSON: We are --
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             THE COURT: What -- what do you seek today on the
   issue of privilege?
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             MS. NELSON: We're asking the Court to quash the
   depositions of the remaining -- of the people that have been
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   noticed. So for the UAW --
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             THE COURT: Because of privilege.
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             MS. NELSON: Correct. That's the Governor.
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             THE COURT: You want me to rule on that today?
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             MS. NELSON: And that's the Treasurer. Well, if you
   -- if you intend to take it under advisement they have noticed
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   those deps for the -- the 12th. They obviously can't go at
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   least as to the --
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              THE COURT: You filed a brief yesterday for a
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   hearing today and you want the parties to respond and me to
  rule on this?
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MS. NELSON: No. Your Honor, we were -- we filed 13-53846-tit Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 62 of 91

that yesterday as a response specifically to --THE COURT: At 20 minutes till 5:00. 2 MS. NELSON: Correct. I understand that. So if the 3 4 Court doesn't believe that it's able to rule today on that 5 issue, that's appropriate and we understand that. THE COURT: How about the parties being given an 6 7 opportunity to respond to it? 8 MS. NELSON: That's -- I have no -- no problem with 9 that either, Your Honor. If the Court wants to take additional time and allow the parties, that's perfectly --10 perfectly appropriate. 11 12 THE COURT: If it's your position that the depositions should not go forward because of this deliberative 13 process privilege or whatever you choose to call it, why 14 wasn't that issue raised in the motion itself which would have 15 16 given the parties an opportunity to address it and the Court? 17 MS. NELSON: Well, first of all, I think it was a 18 matter of timing, Your Honor. We were working at the time with discovery that had been filed prior to the Court's August 19 26th order. 20 21 When we received that discovery it was apparent that it 22 was broad in scope in the context of the Court's order and what it was identifying as fact issues. So we first have to 23 determine the relevancy of that discovery so that we know the

limits of what the -- of what the creditors are actually 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 63 of 91

1 seeking so that we can make specific privilege objections. 2 now have that information in the form of their responses. THE COURT: Right. But you're not making a specific 3 4 privilege objection. What you are making is a request to bar 5 the deposition all together on this ground. MS. NELSON: We are arguing that yes, the Governor's 6 7 deposition --8 THE COURT: And I'm asking you why that could not 9 have been made in your original motion? 10 MS. NELSON: Because we -- because we didn't -- we 11 weren't clear and weren't certain that they in fact were 12 seeking only deliberative process. And it's clear from their 13 response --14 THE COURT: Well, I -- I want to challenge you on 15 that -- I want to challenge you on that. I have to challenge 16 you on that. It's hard for me to imagine what you thought they were 17 18 going to ask the Governor in a deposition other than that. I 19 mean every --20 MS. NELSON: They could have asked --21 THE COURT: The papers they have filed have -- have 22 challenged the Governor's authorization throughout. What else 23 is there to ask him about? 24 MS. NELSON: The Court identified that as its legal

number six. And whether the fact that the Governor Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 64 of

not include anything specific to a carve out with respect to the pensions, is a constitutional issue, renders that authorization invalid.

That was identified as a legal issue by the Court, not a fact issue. So we filed our response specific to that identification by the Court. Now we're talking about bad faith.

The creditors stood here this morning and talked about bad faith. From our perspective, we saw the Court's order dated August 26th, the issue related to the validity of the Governor's authorization was identified as a legal issue based on all of the objections.

All of the objections argued that because the authorization did not provide a carve out if you will for the pensions, it violated Michigan Constitution, Article 9, Section 24. That is a legal issue. What fact issues would be necessary for that?

Now AFSCME and the UAW stood here this morning and said, well, they've -- they've tried to parse these as applied issues. But that's not an as applied issue. That is clearly an application of Michigan Constitution law here to that authorization. Did the Constitution require the Governor.

And so his thinking --

THE COURT: Well --

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   Honor. His motive, his deliberative process for why he didn't
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   include contingencies, doesn't inform that constitutional
   issue or that legal challenge.
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              THE COURT: But you -- you made the conscious
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   decision to get a ruling on -- on -- on relevance and then if
   you lose that to assert the privilege.
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             MS. NELSON: Well, if we -- if --
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              THE COURT: Is that -- is that what happened?
             MS. NELSON: Correct. If the deposition goes
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10
   forward --
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              THE COURT: Is that what happened?
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             MS. NELSON: No. Because if the deposition goes
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   forward --
              THE COURT: Well, I'm having a hard time
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   understanding what did happen if it wasn't that. Because if
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   it wasn't that, you would have asserted the privilege and the
17
   relevance argument at the same time.
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             MS. NELSON: Well, only if we knew of specifically
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   what they were pursuing on behalf of the Governor. That it
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   would include that deliberative process.
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              THE COURT: I thought we had already cleared that
22
   up. Because there isn't anything the government -- Governor
   could testify to other than his deliberative process.
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24
             MS. NELSON: Well, Your Honor, if the conclusion was
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the Governor's deposition would go forward, we would be jt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 66 of 91

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able to assert privilege to a -- on a question by question
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   basis. However, given the responses filed by the creditors,
   it is clear that they are only intending to pursue the
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 4
   deliberative process the Governor made --
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              THE COURT: I quess what I'm suggesting to you is
   that that has been clear from the first paper any of them
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 7
   filed, or nearly then.
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             MS. NELSON: Well, I -- I believe --
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              THE COURT: I want to put to you a different -- I
10
   want to put to you a different question.
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             MS. NELSON: Yes.
              THE COURT: With all the seriousness I can muster
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   here. We have a city who is struggling under a virtually
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    incomprehensible financial burden here.
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             MS. NELSON: Correct.
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              THE COURT: That has -- that has sought relief from
   this Court with the permission of the Governor.
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             MS. NELSON: Correct.
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              THE COURT: In an -- in an attempt to create a
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   viable if not thriving future for itself, right?
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             MS. NELSON: Yes.
              THE COURT: And it needs to do that with all
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   deliberate speed as I think Mr. Bennett said here today. They
   want to file a plan by the end of this year. You heard that,
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1 MS. NELSON: Yes.

THE COURT: The end of this year. Is it really in the best interest of the city and the people of the State of Michigan for the Governor to be asserting a deliberative process privilege in this case, Ma'am?

MS. NELSON: It is in the best interests of the city and the people of the State of Michigan that this proceeding go forward without being muddied up with sidetrack issues focusing on matters that aren't relevant, that are otherwise privileged in terms of the governance of the state which is exactly what's at issue here.

THE COURT: I didn't ask you about relevance. I asked you about privilege.

MS. NELSON: I -- and that's what I'm addressing,
Your Honor. I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. Yes, it is in the
best interests of the city and the citizens of the State of
Michigan to move this case as quickly as possible and to avoid
the -- the delays and the -- that would be caused by
unnecessary and inappropriate discovery which our position is
constitutes these depositions and the bulk of the discovery
requests in terms of the document requests provided, or
requested by UAW, and the other Detroit Police Retirees
Association.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further?

MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, Sharon Levine, Lowenstein, Sandler for AFSCME. Your Honor, we had some previous colloquy with regard to the fact that we believe that there are factual inquiries that we need to make into the state.

And particularly the Governor whether we characterized them today as -- as applied constitutional issues, or good faith or bad faith. We understand that we may be coming up with a process that seems to be percolating that's going to let that get clarified right before the trial, but regardless, we respectfully submit that this discovery is appropriate. We didn't lie in wait. We haven't sought voluminous documents.

All we -- all we served was subpoenas. We're seeking documents directly from the city. We filed those subpoenas on the docket on August 23rd. We asked the state to accept service, they refused. We ran process servers all around the state until we tracked these people down.

We effected service. We learned on Friday afternoon at about -- at 3:00, that the state as asking us to withdraw the subpoenas. We asked them to convey it to us in writing so we could -- we could respond appropriately. We have a bunch of channels that we have to get to. We got through all those channels, Your Honor, in less than an hour.

We cut our list in half. We agreed to cooperate on scheduling. And in response to that subpoena, which I'm

quash Friday night of Labor Day weekend and we responded on Sunday. Apologize if it's not as artfully drafted as it could have been, but we weren't sure what Your Honor's intention was with regard to timing and ruling and we wanted to get papers submitted to the Court.

In addition to that given the -- the -- the speed that this process is moving, and we appreciate Your Honor's consideration of some relaxation of some of those deadlines, if we're really going to be doing oral arguments on the 18th, mediation simultaneously, and trial at the beginning of October, we don't have the ability to not take these depositions immediately and understand what's going on out there.

With regard to the privilege, we would respectfully submit that if Your Honor were to take a look at <u>In Re: NM</u>

<u>Holding Co., LLC</u>, 407 BR 232, Page 287 at Footnote 163 and the cases cited in that footnote, the idea of making substantive legal arguments in a reply on the eve of the hearing is inappropriate and shouldn't be condoned.

We understand that sometimes there are special circumstances, but we'd respectfully submit that having submitted the subpoenas on August 23, this just isn't one of those circumstances.

With regard to the privilege itself, Your Honor -- well,

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night on the issue of privilege. I'm not sure if Your Honor
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   is -- is looking to hear that.
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              THE COURT: I -- I can't ask you to respond to the
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   -- to the privilege assertion that was made at 20 minutes till
 5
   5:00.
             MS. LEVINE: What we don't want to do though, Your
 6
 7
   Honor, is not respond to the extent it's going to preclude
 8
   discovery because we believe the privilege was inappropriately
 9
   asserted.
10
         So I can -- I can basically read what is the notes of a
   rough draft of what our reply brief would be if Your Honor
11
12
   needs it, but given the schedule that we're on and the
    importance of taking the Governor's deposition and the other
13
    state official depositions --
14
              THE COURT: When are they scheduled?
15
16
             MS. LEVINE: I'm sorry?
              THE COURT: When are they scheduled? I'm sorry.
17
18
              MS. LEVINE: Well, we've noticed them -- we -- we
   noticed them on August 23 for the 12th, but as you'll hear
19
20
   later, I'm assuming from the city as well, you know, we've --
   we've -- the parties have been cooperating in terms of
21
   discovery scheduling and we would presume to be able to do
22
23
   that as well with the state witnesses as well.
24
              THE COURT: Uh-huh.
```

25 | MS. LEVINE: But they are all taking place between 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 71 of 91

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now and the 23^{\rm rd}. Maybe one is slipping into the 24^{\rm th} per Your
 1
 2
   Honor's prior scheduling order.
 3
              THE COURT: Uh-huh.
 4
              MS. LEVINE: So should I keep going on privilege?
              THE COURT: This is -- this is --
 5
              MS. LEVINE: I have one associate that worked really
 6
 7
   hard on --
 8
              THE COURT: This is so confounding because -- I'm
 9
   sorry?
10
              MS. LEVINE: I have an associate that worked really
   hard on this.
11
12
              THE COURT: Yeah, I'm sure. You know, as -- as my
   law clerks did as well. It's -- it's confounding because it's
13
   -- it's obviously an important issue.
         You know, in all honesty half of me came into Court today
15
   perfectly willing to pound the gavel and hold a waiver. It's
17
   -- it's just -- it's incomprehensible to me that -- that --
18
   that the Attorney General's office didn't make this privilege
19
   argument in its initial paper in order to facilitate the
20
   Court's processing of it.
21
        Ma'am, I have to ask you. When did you decide to make
   this argument?
22
23
             MS. NELSON: We decided to make this argument on
24
   Thursday.
```

THE COURT: All right. Then let me ask you this 13-53846-tit Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 72 of 91

question, Ma'am. Why on Thursday did you not file a motion to 1 2 adjourn today's argument to give parties an opportunity to address the privilege issue? 3 4 MS. NELSON: Well --5 THE COURT: I ask that because we set this hearing today at your request. 6 7 MS. NELSON: Correct. I understand that, Your 8 Honor. We didn't think it was necessary to do that because we 9 felt that the -- the --THE COURT: You thought I would just accept the 10 privilege argument because you asserted it without giving the 11 12 other parties an opportunity to be heard? 13 MS. NELSON: No, I did not, Your Honor. And I don't mean to offend the Court. Our focus of this motion and this 14 15 hearing was the relevancy issue. 16 We -- our intent was to point out to the Court that there 17 were other privileges that when --18 THE COURT: Well, Ms. Levine is asking a pertinent question then which is, how do we process the privilege issue 19 20 between now and when these depositions will occur which is 21 very soon. MS. NELSON: Correct, I understand. And --22 23 THE COURT: What's your answer to that question? 24 MS. NELSON: I believe that we can -- I have a

sentative from the Governor's office here and t Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38

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that if we can have 15 to 20 minutes to confer with other counsel, we may be able to resolve this issue for the Court. 2 THE COURT: Resolve what issue? 3 4 MS. NELSON: The issue of deposition of the Governor 5 and the parameters of that deposition in the context of deliberative process. As well as with respect to the other 6 7 individuals that they have sought. 8 THE COURT: Well, all right. I'm going to grant you 9 that but only because we need to take a break anyway. We'll 10 reconvene at noon. THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess. 11 12 (Court in Recess at 11:44 a.m.; Resume at 12:00 p.m.) THE CLERK: Court is in session. Please be seated. 13 Recalling case number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan. 14 15 MR. MONTGOMERY: Your Honor, if I may be the protagonist in your last discussion, they're all missing. 17 THE COURT: I see that. All right. I need a 18 volunteer to go talk to the attorneys and ask them to please 19 come back into Court because we are back in session. Thank 20 you. Ah, they're coming. 21 MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, Sharon Levin, Lowenstein, Sandler for AFSCME sorry. But we did use the time 22 productively. And I'm pleased to report to the Court that I 23 think we're 75% towards a resolution. And if the Court might 25 give us another five minutes. 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 74 of 91

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1
              THE COURT: Uh-huh.
 2
             MS. LEVINE: We might be there.
             THE COURT: Sure. We'll reconvene at 12:15 then.
 3
 4
             MS. LEVINE: Thank you, Your Honor.
 5
             MS. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
              THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess.
 6
 7
         (Court in Recess at 12:03 p.m.; Resume at 12:15 p.m.)
 8
              THE CLERK: Court is in session. Please be seated.
 9
             MS. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor, for the
    opportunity to sit and work this out. We do have an agreement
10
11
   in form.
             THE COURT: Uh-huh.
12
13
             MS. NELSON: The Governor has agreed to be deposed
   and the -- and the objectors agree to the following
15
   parameters.
        The deposition will be for three hours. The scope of the
16
17
   inquiry will be those issues raised in the eligibility
18
    objections. The Governor will waive his deliberative process
19
   privilege as to those issues.
20
             THE COURT: Uh-huh.
             MS. NELSON: The deposition of -- of the state
21
22
   Treasurer Andrew Dillon and of Mr. Baird will follow
23
   sequentially if -- subject to the objectors' determination of
24
   necessity, as well as the UAW's 30(b)(6) deposition.
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25 | THE COURT: Uh-huh. 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 75 of 91

1 MS. NELSON: And we will meet and confer with 2 respect to the discovery requests, the duces tecum requests of the UAW. And deliberative process privilege will be waived 3 4 with respect to those documents, but no other privilege will be waived. 5 6 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 7 MS. NELSON: And we will respond similarly to the 8 document request, the amended document request that was 9 attached to the Detroit Police Retiree Association. I think I 10 have the name right. I apologize if I keep confusing that name. So those will be responded to with appropriate 11 12 objections asserted as no objections will be waived. 13 THE COURT: Is that your agreement? 14 MS. LEVINE: Yes, Your Honor, two minor points. 15 There's a -- apparently a deposition transcript of Mr. Baird 16 which the -- which the state has agreed to share with us in 17 advance of the deposition. And we appreciate the -- the 18 waiver of the deliberative process to the extent it exists, 19 but we're not acknowledging that in case it comes up again in this case which is for seven hours. 20 21 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 22 MR. DECHIARA: Your Honor, Peter Dechiara from the

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Ms. Brimer. 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 76 of 91

with the terms as stated on the record.

law firm of Cohen, Weiss, and Simon for the UAW. We agree

23

1 MS. BRIMER: Just for the record, Your Honor, that 2 was I understand the agreement with respect to our document 3 request. However, I want to be clear with respect to what is 4 not being waived. 5 Privileges are not being waived. Other objections relevance, based on their motion to quash, I understand 6 7 they're waiving. We have substantially narrowed our document 8 request and we have agreed and I will put it on the record so 9 that it's clear, we have agreed to limit the documents we have 10 requested to the pre-petition period at this time. 11 THE COURT: Thank you. 12 MS. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: There's one -- one more. MR. WERTHEIMER: Flowers plaintiffs agree also, Your 14 15 Honor. 16 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. The Court 17 concludes that this is an appropriate resolution of these issues and does approve it. I want to thank the Governor, the Attorney General, and 19 20 the other state officials for their cooperation here. May I 21 ask what range of dates you're contemplating for these depositions? 22 23 MS. NELSON: Well, right now --

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THE COURT: As best you --

24

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1
              THE COURT: As best you know right now.
 2
             MS. NELSON: Deps -- the dates that's set in your
    order. We have to have everything done by the 23^{\rm rd} of
 3
 4
   September.
 5
              THE COURT: All right.
              MS. NELSON: So we're going to try to -- we're
 6
 7
   moving with all expediency to get the Governor's dep scheduled
 8
   because that's going to determine whether or not the objectors
 9
   decide they need the others.
10
              THE COURT: All right. Well, not as an invitation
   but as an offer, I will suggest to you that if any disputes
11
12
   arise during the deposition concerning the scope of it, you
13
    can get me on the phone.
             MS. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
14
              THE COURT: Not as an invitation as an offer. Not
15
16
   an invitation to have disputes.
17
             MS. NELSON: Understand.
18
              THE COURT: All right.
19
             MS. NELSON: Thank you very much.
20
              THE COURT: All right. So anything further on the
21
   motion to quash? Are you going to submit an order? Is that
   -- is that what you contemplate?
22
23
             MS. NELSON: I will prepare an order.
24
              THE COURT: All right.
```

 $25\,|_{\mbox{13-53846-tjt}}$ MS. NELSON: I will circulate it to counsel to mak 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 78 of 91

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1
    sure that everybody is agreement.
 2
              THE COURT: All right. Now --
             MR. WERTHEIMER: Your Honor, I have one minor
 3
 4
   matter. It's not related to the motion to quash.
 5
              THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed with that, sir.
              MR. WERTHEIMER: Your Honor, counsel for the UAW
 6
 7
   earlier this morning, it seems like an awfully long time ago,
   moved and you allowed the UAW to -- or your August 26^{\rm th} order
 9
   to reflect the fact that the UAW had asserted the bad faith
   under 921(c).
10
         I had, at least in part, adopted the objections made by
11
12
    the UAW. So I just wanted to make sure that your order would
    apply to the Flowers plaintiffs also.
13
14
              THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, and -- and what I'm -- you
   know, just -- just to, you know, belts and suspenders here,
15
16
    I'm going to put a sentence in -- in the order which says
17
    something like nothing in this order is intended, except as
18
   explicitly stated in it, to limit any of the objections that
   any party has -- has made or adopted in their objections, in
19
20
   their filed objections. It was not the intent of the Court to
   do that.
21
22
             MR. WERTHEIMER: Thank you, Your Honor.
23
              THE COURT: All right. Now I want to circle --
24
   oh --
```

25 | MS. NELSON: Are you circling back to your of 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page

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1
             THE COURT: Yes. That's exactly what I was going to
 2
   do. I want to circle back to the issue of -- of timing.
 3
   Okay. Because it's -- it's an opening issue at this point.
 4
        I'm -- I'm getting more comfortable with -- that's
 5
   all right, take your time.
             MS. NELSON: I'm sorry.
 6
 7
             THE COURT: No, no, it's all right. I
 8
   understand. Yup, that's important.
 9
             MS. NELSON: Before you move on, there is one other
10
   issue I forgot to note, I apologize. The subpoena, the AFSCME
   subpoena for Mr. McTavish is being withdrawn.
11
12
             THE COURT: Is that your agreement?
13
             MS. NELSON: I'm sorry, and Ed.
             THE COURT: Okay.
14
15
             MS. LEVINE: We now have three expanded subpoenas,
   assuming this agreement goes forward.
17
              THE COURT: Okay. All right.
        So what I was going to say was, I'm -- I'm -- I'm
18
   becoming more comfortable with the concept of moving what I've
19
20
   described of -- described as the legal issues to a time closer
   to, if not at the start of the trial that we have set. It
   feels like you all are interested in that extra breathing room
   if I can call it that.
23
24
        In addition, I'm -- I'm -- I'm moving in the direction of
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attempting to understand more specifically how it could be 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 80 of 91

that the issues that I have identified as legal issues, may be discovery and may be factual issues. So I'm going to contemplate that a bit more.

At the same time I liked Mr. Bennett's idea that characterizing in this order an issue as a legal issue should not be interpreted to preclude any of the creditors from arguing that it is not ripe for a decision as a legal issue because there are genuine issues of material fact that need to be resolved at a trial. And -- and -- and thereby pushing it into the factual issue side of the ledger if that's right.

Now what that means is that if we have arguments on what I have preliminarily called legal issues and then I determine that there are factual issues on that, then that gets pushed into the factual issue column to be tried at this trial.

So, you know, again I want to express my appreciation to all of you for your input into this process. You know, we all have our roles to play and it's important for -- for you to play your role as it is important for me to play mine here.

In that vein, let me ask you if we're going to try to have oral arguments on issues that are preliminary -preliminarily characterized as legal issues. If it's -- if it's too soon to do it on the dates I suggested, when would be a good time? And as I ask that question, I have to caution you all that we're not going to be able to fix exact dates

because, you know, we are borrowing this space and -t Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 81 of 91

and the other spaces in the building. 2 And so, you know, any dates we're talking about are always subject to that issue. So let me just throw the floor 3 4 open to that. I mean our choices are for example, two weeks before, one 5 week before to begin the trial instead of beginning the trial 6 7 on factual issues. So anybody out there, anybody. 8 MS. CECCOTTI: Your Honor, I don't have the -- the 9 Court's schedule with me. I guess one consideration would be, and certainly closer to the start of the trial, is -- it makes -- it makes a lot more sense. 11 12 There is a -- a deadline, I believe, that Your Honor has established for the sufficient of a joint pre-trial order. So 13 it might make sense to work --14 15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 16 MS. CECCOTTI: -- with the dates that are set there to the extent that the trial is --17 18 THE COURT: Let's -- let me -- let me pull up --MS. CECCOTTI: -- going to only be then on a more 19 20 limited set of issues than the parties would not -- now the other way to do that, I suppose, is to have the pre-trial due closer to the time of the 23rd. And I just unfortunately 23 don't --24 THE COURT: Let's -- let's get those dates.

25 | MS. CECCOTTI: Okay. 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 82 of 91

1 THE COURT: Does anybody know the docket number of the order? Yeah. 2 280. 3 THE CLERK: 4 THE COURT: 280, thank you. Yes, thank you. Okay. Well, the last of the depositions is October 10^{th} . October 17^{th} 5 is the deadline to submit a joint final pre-trial order and to 6 7 file briefs, pre-trial conference the 21^{st} , trial the 23^{rd} . 8 What makes sense if we're going to keep with that 9 scheduled to do oral arguments on legal issues preliminarily 10 designated as such? MS. CECCOTTI: May we have a moment, Your Honor? 11 12 Thank you. MR. BENNETT: While they're discussing it, I would 13 propose a week before the 17th because we'll find out whether 14 there are -- what the factual issue landscape will really look 15 16 like which could possibly influence the pre-trial order and everybody's trial preparation. 17 18 There is a -- I think we've been asked to reserve for mediation the 7^{th} and the 8^{th} of October. 19 20 THE COURT: Uh-huh, uh-huh. 21 MR. BENNETT: So I don't remember what days of the week that are -- those are, but the 9^{th} or the -- 9^{th} would be 22 fine. October 9th is a Thursday, that would -- I'm sorry, the 23 $9^{\rm th}$ -- the $9^{\rm th}$ would be available and would be perfectly fine. 2.4

THE COURT: Are we having a genuine issue of 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 83 of 91

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material fact on what day of the week is on what day? Okay.
 2
    So you're committed to -- to mediation on what dates again?
              MR. BENNETT: The 7<sup>th</sup>. We've been asked to reserve
 3
    the 7^{th} and 8^{th}.
 4
              THE COURT: 8th and 9th is Tuesday and Wednesday.
 5
              MR. BENNETT: Okay. So then -- then I guess we'd --
 6
 7
    I'd propose the 10<sup>th</sup>.
 8
              MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, I think the concept is that
 9
    we do the legal oral argument just before the pre-trial is
    due, then have a little bit of time to negotiate the pre-trial
10
    and then start the trial.
11
         I would -- I would respectfully request that you give us
12
    a little bit of flexibility to talk amongst ourselves. We
13
    perhaps can consult further with the Court on the dates so we
14
    don't interfere with the mediation.
15
              THE COURT: You mean like take a break right now?
16
              MS. LEVINE: If that's -- if that's appropriate. I
17
    just don't have the scheduling in front of me.
              THE COURT: That's fine with me. I -- I just want
19
20
    to repeat my caution to you that to the extent you pick a
    specific date as opposed to a date range, I may have trouble
21
22
    accommodating you. I may not, but I may. So the more
    flexibility you can give me the better.
23
24
              MS. LEVINE: Well, people were saying, Your Honor,
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we're in agreement, is please don't interfere with the 3846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 84 of 91

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1
   mediation dates, that may be where the real concern --
 2
              THE COURT: Right. Well, right.
              MS. LEVINE: And secondly, I think we'd like to be
 3
 4
   as close to the pre-trial conference as possible so we're
   through and after the discovery period ends to the extent the
 5
   pre-trial deadline has to move slightly --
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Okay. So you're --
              MS. LEVINE: -- to accommodate mediation and
 8
 9
   discovery. We would not oppose that.
10
              THE COURT: You're -- you're thinking sometime
   between the 10^{th}, 11^{th}, 12^{th} of October and the 17^{th} is when your
11
12
    joint final pre-trial statement is due.
13
              MS. LEVINE: Any objection?
              MS. CECCOTTI: Yeah. Your Honor, I think we're
14
   trying to confirm a time here. It may just be that between
15
16
   the mediation schedule and everything else including what we
   -- we know the Court's available on the 23rd because you've
17
18
   already said that.
19
              THE COURT: Right.
20
              MS. CECCOTTI: It may just be that that's where we
21
   end up just by default and then the trial. And we'll just
   deal with those issues --
22
23
              THE COURT: You know, why don't -- why don't -- why
   don't we just agree upon that right now.
```

25 | MS. LEVINE: That's fine. 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 85 of 91

THE COURT: Why don't we just say the 23rd for these eligibility objections. I will try to give you a decision at the conclusion then on which of the legal issues do require a trial and we'll just barrel right into the trial. Is that okay?

MR. BENNETT: I think I could to -- to -- if we want to try to streamline the trial and -- and be in a position to have fewer witnesses and -- and -- and possibly inconvenience fewer people, it would make sense to try to have as many issues resolved as possible on a legal basis.

It may be totally futile, but I doubt it. And so I -- I was just --

THE COURT: I -- I -- I certainly -- I certainly will not commit to giving you a ruling on the substance of the legal issues immediately after the argument. I don't perceive doing that until the decision on the -- on the issues that revolve -- resolve around the issues of fact.

MR. BENNETT: So I -- I think it would help everyone if we -- if we knew what issues -- what factual issues arose that require some distance ahead of the pre-trial order. So I think that dates which do work around the proposed mediation schedule of the $11^{\rm th}$ or $12^{\rm th}$ -- $10^{\rm th}$, $11^{\rm th}$, $12^{\rm th}$, I think one of those may be a weekend, that's a good time because it -- whatever guidance -- it gives us --

THE COURT: Well, let's -- let's ask the creditors $13\mbox{-}53846\mbox{-tjt}$ Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13' Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 86 of 91

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Can you -- can you agree to have an oral argument on the
    preliminary legal issues on the 11th, Friday, the 11th of
 2
    October, or Monday the 14<sup>th</sup>?
 3
 4
              MS. CECCOTTI: Your Honor, I'm sorry. Could you
    repeat the dates again? I apologize.
 5
              THE COURT: Friday, the 11th, or Monday, the 14th.
 6
 7
    The 14^{th} is Columbus Day.
 8
              MS. CECCOTTI: All right.
 9
              THE COURT: A federal holiday.
              MS. CECCOTTI: Does that preclude us from the Court
10
    -- of using the courtroom?
11
12
              THE COURT: It creates --
13
              MS. CECCOTTI: It creates a problem.
14
              THE COURT: -- issues that are not worth attempting
    to address.
15
16
              MS. CECCOTTI: Right, okay.
17
              THE COURT: So it would be the 15th, two days before,
    or the 11<sup>th</sup>, Friday -- Friday the 11<sup>th</sup>, or Tuesday the 15<sup>th</sup>.
19
              MS. CECCOTTI: 15<sup>th</sup>, I think it would have to be the
    15th then with the discovery cut off date.
20
              THE COURT: Can you live with that, Mr. Bennett?
21
              MR. BENNETT: I'll make it work, Your Honor.
22
23
              THE COURT: Sir?
              MR. MONTGOMERY: Your Honor, subject to the
24
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 $\frac{\text{udible}}{\text{tit}}$ Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 87 of 91

1 THE COURT: Right, all right. Thank you. All 2 right. So we'll move the oral arguments to Tuesday, the 15th at 10:00 a.m. We'll -- we'll have to do the best we can to --3 4 to get a courtroom on that date. Is there any objection if I go ahead with my plan to hear 5 from the individuals who filed eligibility objections on the 7 date previously scheduled? Which was what, Chris? THE CLERK: The 19^{th} . 8 THE COURT: The 19^{th} of September. 9 10 MR. MONTGOMERY: Again, Your Honor (Inaudible). Some of those individuals fall within (Inaudible). 11 12 THE COURT: Right. MR. MONTGOMERY: (Inaudible). 13 14 THE COURT: Yeah. Again, it wouldn't be my intention to rule on those, I just want to give them an 15 16 opportunity to be heard and hear them. Some of you may want 17 to attend, some of you may not feel the need to do that. Of 18 course the city has an opportunity to respond as they see fit, but I'd like to do that because if I reschedule that, then we 19 20 have to send out another mailing and confuse them even more. 21 Any objections? All right. Then -- then I -- I think, Chris, we will still go ahead with that. 23 All right. Are there any other open issues for today 24 then?

25 | MS. CECCOTTI: The -- we had an exchange earlier on 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 88 of 91

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the UAW's 109(c)(4) objection, Your Honor. I didn't know what
 2
   you were planning to -- I sincerely hoped you had planned
 3
   to --
 4
              THE COURT: I don't -- I don't -- I don't either. I
 5
   want to think about that some more. I appreciate the position
   you take on it and it does require further consideration on my
 7
   part.
 8
             MS. CECCOTTI: Okay. Thank you.
 9
             THE COURT: Anybody else? Somebody is stepping
   forward. Sir.
10
             MR. PLECHA: Good morning, Your Honor. Ryan Plecha
11
12
   on behalf of the Retiree Association parties.
13
        I just wanted to bring to the Court's attention the issue
14
   I brought up about the concern of coordinating rebuttal.
   light of the new date I just wanted to make sure that the
15
16
   Court considered that in making its determination.
17
              THE COURT: Oh, that's right. You all were going to
   talk about that and get back to me on that. Thank you.
        The question was, do you want to do rebuttal on the same
19
20
   day, or do you want an opportunity to coordinate your rebuttal
21
   to the next day.
22
             MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, let's reserve it for the
23
   next day. And if it turns out that we coordinate in four
   minutes in the whole, then we haven't lost --
```

THE COURT: That works for me too. 13-53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 89 of 91

MR. PLECHA: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: So I will assume that all the arguments will be on the one day, but if you tell me you need an opportunity to go to the next day, I will certainly grant you that. And let's put that in the order as well. Anything further from anyone? All right, we're done. Thank you. THE CLERK: All rise. Court is adjourned. (Court Adjourned at 12:37 p.m.) 25 | 13 | 53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 90 of 91

PAGE ____91

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1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
   We certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
 7
 8
   electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the
 9
    above-entitled matter.
10
    /s/Deborah L. Kremlick, CER-4872 Dated: 9-19-13
11
    Letrice Calloway
12
13
14
15
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25 | 13 53846-tjt Doc 948 Filed 09/19/13 Entered 09/19/13 15:33:38 Page 91 of 91
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